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favour of maintaining and preserving life, along wit
recognition that there are circumstances in whic
morally justifiable to refuse, withhold, or withdraw 
therapy.
Health prof ssionals in Australia must negotiate di
between and within different religious traditions on616 MJA • Volume 183 Number 1ABSTRACT
• Religious or spiritual values often influence health care 
decision-making by patients and their families, particularly in 
times of crisis.
• Though religious values might seem to be irrelevant where 
continuing treatment is judged to be “futile”, such clinical 
assessments should instead serve to open a dialogue about 
values and beliefs.
• The six major religious traditions in Australia have some 
similar values and principles about death and provision of 
care for the dying, but differ in their processes of ethical 
reasoning, cosmologies, and key moral concepts.
• Engaging with religious traditions on the common ground of 
basic values (such as human dignity, care, the sacredness of 
human life, non-violence, compassion, and selflessness) 
promotes negotiation of the manner in which care is 
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provided, even where conflicts exist.or
me
deF  decades there has been debate over whether familymbers, health care professionals, or other surrogatecision-makers should be permitted to make the decision
to withdraw ventilation and artificial nutrition and hydration from
patients who are no longer able to breathe on their own or feed
themselves, when such withdrawal will inevitably lead to death.
This debate is characterised by a general, moral presumption in
h widespread
h it may be
life-sustaining
fferences both
 the issue of
withdrawal of treatment. They should also be guided by broad,
liberal principles of respect for, and tolerance of, the variety of
religious practices and beliefs. They should also be sensitive to
religious perspectives on this issue insofar as they are important to
patients and their families, particularly in times of crisis.
To increase knowledge and awareness about religious perspec-
tives on withdrawal of treatment, we solicited commentaries on a
hypothetical case from scholars representing the six major reli-
gious traditions in Australia. Each commentary covers a range of
views within each religious tradition, and is grounded in key texts,
scholarly and popular interpretations of these doctrines, and
contemporary religious practices in Australia.
A hypothetical scenario
David is a 54-year-old computer engineer from Sydney. He is married
with three children, and has always enjoyed good health. About 9
months ago, he was found to have stage IIB Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He
was treated with standard chemotherapy and attained a complete
remission, with an 80%–85% chance that his lymphoma would never
return.
David later developed a dry cough, sore throat, and fevers. He
became progressively short of breath and, on admission to hospital, was
diagnosed with severe influenza pneumonia. He was transferred to the
intensive care unit (ICU) where he had to be sedated, intubated, and
ventilated because of worsening hypoxia. A nasogastric tube was
inserted to enable feeding (thus providing artificial nutrition/hydration).
David’s condition continued to deteriorate and, after 12 days, he was
still ventilator-dependent on 100% inspired oxygen, and required adren-
aline and dobutamine infusions to maintain his blood pressure, and
dialysis because of kidney failure. There was no evidence that he had
brain damage. He also required continuing sedation so that the ventila-
tor could work effectively, and this could not be stopped in order to wake
him and establish his wishes regarding treatment.
In light of these events, David’s team met with his extended family to
discuss his situation.
At this meeting, David’s ICU specialist and his haematologist
explained that, in their opinion, David was not going to survive, and that
further treatment would only delay his death. They recommended to his
wife, Erica, that he remain sedated, that the medications supporting his
blood pressure be discontinued, and that he be taken off the ventilator.
The family was told that if this approach was taken David would be likely
to die within minutes. At this point of the discussion, Erica was asked
whether she needed more information before the decision was made to
withdraw medications and ventilation, and whether she would like to
speak with hospital support staff, such as a chaplain.
A Catholic perspective
Mindful that human dignity is preserved in every stage and state of
life, Catholics recognise that the direct and voluntary killing of an
innocent human person is always gravely wrong.1 Where life-
saving or life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn or withheld with
the intention of ending a person’s life, this is an unethical action or
omission irrespective of any good motive, and so is regarded as
morally equivalent to euthanasia or suicide.1 However, to forgo
treatments because they are likely to be futile or overly-burden-1/12 • 5/19 December 2005
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suicide, but an acceptance of the human condition in the face of
death.1
David’s condition is continuing to deteriorate in spite of inten-
sive treatment, and his treating doctors do not expect him to
survive. If the ventilator and blood pressure medications are
unlikely to sustain David’s life for much longer, they may be
regarded as therapeutically futile and, on a Catholic account, may
no longer be ethically required. Even if some of his treatments —
such as ventilation — do continue to offer some therapeutic or
physiological benefit, these may well be overly burdensome, as is
indicated by the need to heavily sedate David in order to ventilate
him. In such cases there is no moral requirement to accept such an
intrusion in order to secure a few days’ more life.
Until now, David has been sedated so that the ventilation can
work effectively. If the ventilator is removed, and there are no other
symptomatic benefits to be gained from continued sedation, the
sedation should also be withdrawn. Sedation should not be
continued if its only foreseeable effect will be to hasten death by
further compromising David’s breathing. If David’s sedation can be
lightened to a level that is compatible with comfort as well as some
degree of lucidity, albeit for a short time, he may have an
opportunity to say his goodbyes, receive the sacraments or
otherwise prepare himself for death. Catholics would regard this as
a great benefit.
Doctors expect that David’s death will follow soon after with-
drawing ventilation. Catholics would not regard withdrawal of
treatment in this case as homicide, suicide or euthanasia, because
the intention is not to shorten David’s life but rather to withdraw a
futile or overly-burdensome treatment. It is foreseen that this might
shorten his life, but shortening his life is not the reason for taking
the course of action and there is a good reason to take this risk.
A test of what the clinicians and family intend would be to ask,
what if, after removing the ventilator, it was found that David was
able to breathe unassisted? If the doctors and family would not
regard this with disappointment, as if their goals were somehow
defeated, then they can honestly say they are not removing the
ventilator with the intention of shortening life. Erica, for one,
might be delighted, so her goal here is clearly not euthanasia. And
if David’s condition continues to deteriorate, the clinicians and
family would presumably ensure that David received all appropri-
ate palliative care.
Importantly, Catholic ethics emphasises that futility and burden-
someness never pertain to the life of a patient, but to discernible
features in and of the treatment.2 The burdens of treatment are
usually considered alongside the benefits that can reasonably be
expected to follow from a particular treatment regimen, and within
the context of a patient’s overall condition and its potential for
improvement, his resources, and sensibility. Catholic ethics aims to
avoid two extremes: an unrealistic and unkind survival-at-any-cost
mentality, which bears no relation to the overall wellbeing of the
patient; and an all-too-ready disregard for the value of life, based
upon misplaced compassion or resource-focused pragmatism.
An evangelical Protestant/Anglican perspective
Anglicanism includes a wide spectrum of viewpoints on with-
drawal of treatment. Some Anglicans may accommodate the
option of withdrawal, while others may want life extended at all
costs. In the following account, the use of the first person “we” is
intended to reflect the evangelical mindset, which is characterised
by a strong commitment to the Bible as the final authority in
matters of faith and life. Not all Anglicans are evangelical, and
evangelicalism is not confined to Anglicanism.
In our understanding, death was not originally intended for
humanity. It was defeated by Jesus Christ in his resurrection, and
will one day be eradicated by God. Until then, we are certain that
we will die, and that judgment by God will follow. This motivates
us to find forgiveness and peace with God through Jesus Christ
before death. It also means that we do not expect life to be
preserved indefinitely or “at all costs”. But as humans are made for
life, we urge and expect doctors to continue fighting for as long as
they can, and we trust that they will have the wisdom and
expertise to know when the battle is lost. Given all this, we will
often accept “withdrawal of treatment” and “allowing to die” as
necessitated by death’s current grip on humanity.
Medical personnel should also be aware that we may express
conflicted reactions to dying and death. First, we are not always
true to our convictions. In our grief and pain, we may desperately
cling to life at all costs, as if humans never need die, and as if
medical science has conquered death. We may forget to trust our
Lord, as if this life is all there is, and as if there is no hope for
eternity.
Second, we long for every avenue to be exhausted in the fight for
young spouses or children. We may find it easier to accept that our
grandparent’s “time” might “have come”, even though we implac-
ably oppose any judgment that the elderly are less precious or
more expendable because of their age. But in common with theMJA • Volume 183 Number 11/12 • 5/19 December 2005 617
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treatment from young people.
Third, we are concerned about the eternal destiny of our loved
ones, and wish for them to make their peace with God. Hence we
may press forcefully and irrationally for extra time, without
revealing our concerns to medical personnel, who may not share
our beliefs and who may be perplexed by our requests.
If we imagined Erica to be an evangelical Christian, then she
can allow David to die because she knows that all must die.
However, she would expect medical personnel to give good
reasons for their advice, and would press for detail as to why
further treatment is futile. She would want to know why the
battle for David should not continue, and she might wonder
whether medical advice was driven by professional pride, by
concerns about scarce resources, or by a failure to esteem David
as precious enough for care. Were she convinced of the goodwill
of medical personnel, and that the battle was lost, her Christian
faith would not, in itself, prevent her from allowing David to die,
although her grief may hinder her. She will be more troubled,
however, if she thinks David has not found forgiveness and peace
with God. In that case, she might press harder for the extension
of his life, but may be embarrassed to articulate this motivation
to medical staff, given that many dismiss the reality of a
judgment beyond death.
An Orthodox Jewish perspective
Judaism views every moment of life as sacred. The daily prayers
open with, “You preserve the soul within me and You will in the
future take it from me”. Only God, who is the source of all life, can
take life away: “Until all vital forces ebb from the body as
evidenced by total cessation of both respiratory and cardiac
activity, human life must be treasured as a sacred gift”.3 Even the
desecration of the Sabbath is mandated by the Talmud if the reason
is to rescue someone who might be alive.
Jewish law designates a patient whose death is imminent and
inevitable as a gosses (which can be defined as the state of being of
someone who is dying until his or her soul has departed). Such a
person has full legal capacity and is able to transfer property or
issue a divorce, since “[a] gosses is to be considered a living person
in every respect . . .”.4 The Sabbath must even be violated to save or
prolong the life of a gosses: “The mitzvah [good deed] of saving his
life applies even if it is clear that he cannot live for even another
hour . . .”.5 There is, however, no requirement to start treatment to
prolong life which will only add suffering to a patient who has
reached the natural end of a disease.
In Jewish law, a physician has the responsibility to treat a patient,
even if only to prolong life. He may not withhold food, fluids, or
oxygen, even if these need to be delivered by artificial means.6
Acts or interventions intended to hasten the death of a gosses
through physical contact are identified as murderous. However, it
is permissible to make someone more comfortable in their dying,
for example by silencing troublesome noises, even though the
alleviation of the distress might both ease and accelerate the
patient’s dying.
Where a patient is beyond cure, but there is the possibility of
treating pain, this is permissible. Some authorities will allow for the
inevitability of consequential morphine-induced respiratory depres-
sion, so long as the primary purpose of the medication is clearly to
alleviate pain and not to hasten death.7 In contrast, the withdrawal
of artificial ventilation is considered by many authorities as an overt
act, and is prohibited under all circumstances except if the patient is
brain dead. For example, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg states that a
respirator should not be disconnected from a patient if it is unclear
whether it is keeping him alive or merely ventilating a corpse. He
does, however, recommend that ventilators be fitted with time-
clocks set for a 12-hour or 24-hour period so that they switch off
automatically, thus enabling observation of the patient for signs of
spontaneous respiration. Where these signs are absent, and if the
heart is not beating and the brain is irreversibly damaged, there is no
need to reconnect the ventilator.8,9
In David’s case, his brain is fully functioning. There is no
question of his being brain dead. Thus, even if he could be brought
to consciousness, under Jewish law, he would not be allowed to
direct that his treatment be discontinued.
David is a gosses. While his death is inevitable, under Jewish law
the doctors must continue to treat him. This includes both medica-
tion for his blood pressure and continuation of his ventilation.
An Islamic perspective
In Islam, death is a stage of divine evolution, and the eternal
existence of Muslims after death is determined by what they do
with their lives. Muslims try to pass this “test” by submitting to the
rules of God. Many seek advice about right conduct from the
clergy. Islamic scholars (Ayatollahs and Muftis) are responsible for
Feqh (Islamic law and rules of conduct), which draws on four
traditional sources of moral authority for decision-making (Ijti-
had):
• the Koran (the Holy text);
• the Sunnah (words or deeds of the prophet);
• the consensus of the learned; and
• Aghl (wisdom).10
These authorities are listed in order of reliability. Thus, if if the
Koran provides an answer to an ethical dilemma, Muslims do not
refer to the Sunnah. If the answer cannot be found in the Koran or
the Sunnah, and there is no consensus between scholars, Muslims
may follow the authority which seems most reasonable to them.618 MJA • Volume 183 Number 11/12 • 5/19 December 2005
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be “solved” by recourse to the Koran or the Sunnah, Muslims must
consult all these sources of moral authority.
According to Islam, life is a precious gift bestowed by God;
therefore, we do not have absolute power over it. Furthermore, the
prophet Mohammad said, “Seek treatment, for every illness God
created a treatment”.11 So, based on Islamic doctrines, in the
scenario described, neither David nor his family are allowed to
discontinue his life if there is a possibility of recovery:
Whoever takes a human life, for other than murder or corrup-
tion in the earth, it is as if he has taken the life of all mankind.
(Koran 5: 32)11
Although most Muslim authorities agree that brain death consti-
tutes acceptable grounds for discontinuing life support, David has
multiple organ failure without brain death. Because he still has the
possibility of an active, conscious life, his eternal fate is still in his
hands, and he should be allowed to use every minute of that life.
In cases such as this, most mainstream Islamic scholars would
regard withdrawal of David’s treatment as non-voluntary active
euthanasia, and any form of euthanasia is forbidden in Islam. As
Ayatollah Makaram Shirazy states:
Killing a human being is absolutely forbidden even with the
patient’s permission, and with the intention of reducing
suffering . . . The permission of such an act makes it open to
abuse. This could be used as a legitimate way to commit
suicide. Besides, medicine . . . is not able to be absolutely certain
about the outcome of treatment . . .12
Thus, most Islamic scholars would choose to wait for nature to
take its course, rather than withdraw ventilation and circulatory
support. According to others, such as Dr Hassan Hathout:
If there is no hope of treatment, you may withdraw the life
support equipment. In an attempt to prolong life without
quality, one must not prolong the misery at a high cost.13
Other Muslim intellectuals, such as Dr Abdulkarim Soroush,
argue for a modern approach that emphasises thinking rather than
simply following,14 and that deems moral values to have an extra-
religious origin. This approach, which is rooted in the Mu’tazilah
(Schismatic) school of Islamic philosophy, allows for more flexibil-
ity and debate. However, it has been marginalised by both Sunnis
and Shiites. Historically, Islam has been dominated by the rival
‘Ash’ari’ philosophy, which holds that good and bad are meaning-
less outside religious teachings. Muslim theologians have recently
tried to revive Mu’tazilah ideas, both in the interpretation of Koran
and in Feqh.15
Because both traditional and modern movements are alive in
Muslim communities, an open and honest discussion is the only
way to learn a Muslim family’s wishes in a case like David’s.
A Hindu perspective
Hinduism comprises many autonomous sects and has no central-
ised authority. Nor is it a religion of “the book”. However,
contemporary debates about termination of treatment can legiti-
mately draw on the longstanding debate about self-willed death in
a religious literature that dates back to 1500 BCE.16 The debate
surrounding this practice provides grounds for supporting — or at
least not condemning — the withdrawal of treatment from
terminally ill patients, if regulated by well defined criteria.
Classical Hindu literature distinguishes between suicide, volun-
tary heroic death, and voluntary religious death. Suicide was
clearly condemned in ancient times. Voluntary heroic death was
considered not only acceptable, but meritorious. It was practised
by ancient warriors to avoid capture, by women to avoid rape or
enslavement, or by a king to allow peaceful succession to the
throne. Voluntary religious death was practised by the incurably
ill, or by those unable to perform the mandatory rites of bodily
purification because of age or incapacity. This was also considered
a legitimate exception from the general rules of dharma (social
order) and ahimsa (non-violence), and was considered a religious
act by Hindu jurists. Community leaders (Brahmins) decided
whether any case of self-willed death was legitimate.
The law of karma (actions which earn the individual merit or
demerit) is also central to the classical Hindu discussion of self-
willed death. While suicide was considered a sin leading to hell,
religious or heroic self-willed death could burn up bad karma and
thereby expiate sin and produce good karma, triggering salvation.
A religious or heroic self-willed death was distinguished from
suicide by a formal and public announcement of intention, and the
subsequent exercising of willpower to achieve it.
By the 10th century CE, strong criticism of euthanasia had
developed within Hinduism, probably because of perceived abuses
of this and related practices of self-willed death. With the advent of
British law in India, suicide was deemed to be a criminal act, and
was interpreted so as to include all forms of self-willed death.
Mahatma Gandhi, an uncompromising proponent of ahimsa,
accepted suicide and euthanasia in certain cases: “Should my child
be attacked by rabies and there was no hopeful remedy to relieve
his agony, I should consider it my duty to take his life”. He also
approved of the mercy-killing of a calf, calling it “an expression of
purest ahimsa”, and added that he would “do the same for his own
child”.17
Contemporary Hindu attitudes to euthanasia were examined in
1988 in Hinduism Today.18,19 Four Hindu doctors and six Hindu
religious leaders (all practicing in the United States) were ques-
tioned about the treatment of terminally ill patients including
“ceas[ing] everything but minimal care after a short time”. Support
for active euthanasia among the doctors reflected the results of a
recent California poll (70% in favour). The six religious leaders
generally opposed active euthanasia, but their specific comments
on the issue revealed little consistency in their reasoning on the
issue of withdrawal of treatment.
I sought an opinion on the hypothetical case in question from an
Australian Hindu and consultant physician, Dr S Siva Kumaran.
He believes Hindus are more accepting and less fearful of death
because of their belief in karma, and therefore would not support
the unnecessary prolongation of life. He supported this view byMJA • Volume 183 Number 11/12 • 5/19 December 2005 619
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withdrawal of treatment in cases similar to David’s. He said that
Australian Hindus would not seek advice and solace from a priest
in such circumstances, but would rely on family advice and seek
solace and aid from their community.
A Tibetan Buddhist perspective
There is a range of perspectives regarding the process of dying
among Buddhist traditions, with no clear consensus, and opinions
about the morality of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment will
vary between adherents of these traditions. Asian Buddhist teach-
ers have generally been unwilling to weigh in on bioethical debates
such as withdrawing treatment from terminally ill patients, organ
donation, and abortion. To date, most of the work on these issues
has been done by Western Buddhist scholars, who extrapolate
Buddhist principles that are pertinent to current conundrums.
Buddhist traditions unanimously condemn suicide and prema-
ture ending of life, but allow it in exceptional circumstances in
which a person ends his or her life in order to help others, as
manifested in past-life stories of the Buddha himself.
These principles can be extrapolated to the case of withdrawing
life support from a terminally ill patient. To be morally “in the
clear” from a Buddhist perspective, a doctor or relative who
decides to terminate extraordinary measures for maintaining life
should be an advanced practitioner who can read the mind of the
patient and accurately foresee the results of various possible
choices. If the decision to withdraw treatment is based on certainty
that the patient will suffer needlessly from further treatment, and
the decision is taken in order to avoid pain and facilitate a better
rebirth, then it is blameless — even admirable — from a Buddhist
perspective. But for those who lack the cognitive abilities attrib-
uted to advanced Buddhist practitioners, any decision regarding
termination of life support becomes problematic, because ordinary
people cannot foresee karmic futures.
Tibetan Buddhism has the most extensive literature on death
and dying of any Buddhist tradition. According to the Tibetan
medical system, largely derived from the Kalacakra-tantra, living
beings, including humans, are conceived mainly in terms of subtle
energies which circulate in energy channels throughout the body.
During the process of death, these energies coalesce in the region
of the heart (which is the seat of consciousness, rather than the
brain). As a person dies, the various elements that sustain life
dissolve, and one becomes progressively unable to function. As the
coarser levels of mind disintegrate, progressively more subtle ones
manifest.
The point of actual death occurs when the “mind of clear light”
manifests. Following this, the mind of clear light acquires a subtle
body which it will inhabit during the “intermediate state” (bar do)
between one life and the next. This state can last between 7 and 49
days, after which one will be reborn in another body in accordance
with one’s past actions (karma). According to standard notions of
karma, death occurs as a result of one’s actions and various external
factors, and extraordinary methods to prolong life are an imposi-
tion on this process and ultimately pointless. Death is not viewed
as a tragedy, as one has died countless times in the past.
Once the process has begun and the first stage of dissolution has
occurred, death is inevitable, and the patient has no chance of true
recovery. Extraordinary means for prolonging life merely hold
karmic outcomes in temporary abeyance and bring unnecessary
suffering to the patient. Hence, there is little point in prolonging
the life of a terminally ill person whose karma has precipitated the
process of physical dissolution. The finality of death is certain, and
nothing can be gained by artificially interrupting the process —
particularly as any such intervention may cause pain and mental
anguish, which negatively affect a person’s thoughts at a crucial
time. The best course is to let the process of dying continue, while
ensuring that the person is as comfortable as possible.
Discussion
Religious beliefs may have considerable influence on decisions
made by patients, their families, and their carers, particularly at the
end of a life. While some would suggest that values, including
religious values, are irrelevant in situations where continuing
treatment is judged to be “futile”, we suggest that such clinical
assessments should serve to open a dialogue about values and
beliefs, rather than to circumvent it. It is therefore important that
clinicians have some understanding of the differences between and
within the main religious traditions in Australia. Clearly, given the
cultural diversity of Australian society, and that comparative
religion is not part of traditional medical curricula, this is no small
task.
We have tried to provide some guidance by soliciting case
commentaries on a specific ethical issue from each of the six main
religions in Australia. The brevity of these commentaries means
that they cannot represent the full breadth of views within each
religious tradition, and we accept that other members of these
religious traditions may take issue with the interpretations pro-
vided. Nevertheless, the commentaries are instructive in four ways.
• They show how religious traditions and religious authorities
may differ with respect to the degree of guidance they offer in the
face of ethical dilemmas created by modern medical practice, such
as withdrawal of treatment. Some may give explicit rulings about
whether such an action is permissible in a particular case; some
may offer general guidance about the moral significance of specific
actions such as withdrawing sedation or communicating with the
family; and others may offer no specific guidance, but provide a
means of framing the issue by extrapolating from its traditional
stories or its history of debates.
• They give some sense of the heterogeneity of interpretations,
beliefs, and practices within each religious tradition. This provides
a salient reminder that assumptions about a particular religious
view, or about a particular individual, may often be erroneous, or
may simply prejudice clinical interactions.
• They emphasise that, while it is important to gain an
understanding of the variability between and within religious
traditions from authoritative sources, the importance of religion
differs between individuals, and choices and behaviours are
unlikely to be influenced by religious beliefs alone. Culture,620 MJA • Volume 183 Number 11/12 • 5/19 December 2005
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choices that people make and the way they live. In light of this,
there is no substitute for talking with patients and their lay
carers in order to better understand their religious beliefs, their
worldviews, and the moral concepts or values that are important
to them, and the way each of these may impact on their
preferences for health care.
• They show that religious and secular views are most likely to
find common ground within a discourse on basic values such as
human dignity, care, the sacredness of human life, non-violence,
compassion, and selflessness. Except for the notion of sacredness,
this list has much to recommend it from the point of view of
secular morality.
Different religious traditions have diverse perspectives on death
and the provision of care for the dying, and not all may be
commensurate with contemporary understandings of biology, or
with various institutional demands. However, by engaging with
religious traditions on the common ground of basic values, it may
be possible to negotiate the manner in which care is provided —
even where conflicts exist.
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